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HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Murray Dry* 
On June 22, 1992, the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously struck down a bias-motivated crime ordinance in R.A. V. 
v. St. Paul, Minnesota,! and then on June 11, 1993 it unanimously 
upheld a penalty enhancement provision for bias-motivated 
crimes in Wisconsin v. Mitchel/.2 These two different decisions in 
otherwise similar cases appear to be explicable on the basis of 
the difference between speech, or expression, which is protected 
by the First Amendment, and conduct, which is not, as the 
Supreme Court maintained.3 In the first case, petitioner R.A.V. 
was charged with burning a cross on a black family's lawn; the 
Court regarded such conduct as protected symbolic expression. 
In the second case, Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery 
and then had his sentence enhanced, from two years to four, 
when the jury determined that he had selected his victim on the 
basis of race. Mitchell, who is black, directed three of his friends 
to beat up a white boy, after they had all seen the movie Missis-
sippi Burning, in which "a white man beat up a black boy who 
was praying."4 
The cases are complicated and worthy of careful study for 
two reasons. First, the Supreme Court divided five to four on the 
grounds of the decision in the R.A. V. case. In his court opinion, 
Justice Scalia complicated first amendment law by extending 
some protection to forms of expression, such as "fighting words," 
that had previously been viewed as categories of simply unpro-
tected speech; the four concurring Justices took issue with that, 
claiming both that it was unnecessary since the law was over-
broad in the first place, and also that if the law had not been 
overbroad the substantial harm of the prohibited symbolic ex-
pression justified the prohibition. Second, the Mitchell case was 
• Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College, Vermont. 
1. -U.S.-; 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
2. -U.S.-; 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). 
3. "But whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at 
expression ... the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First 
Amendment." ld. at 2201. 
4. ld. at 2196. 
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closer to the R.A. V. case-and more difficult-than the Supreme 
Court acknowledged. The Wisconsin Supreme Court treated the 
issues more fully, as we shall see. In addition, Professor Cass 
Sunstein, who supported the Mitchell decision, nonetheless wrote 
the following: 
But consider the fact that the government imposes the ad-
ditional penalty because it thinks that hate crimes create dis-
tinctive subjective and objective harm. The distinctive harm is 
produced in part because of the symbolic or expressive nature 
of hate crimes. This justification is the same as that in the 
cross-burning case. This does not mean that it is impossible to 
draw distinctions between enhanced penalty statutes and 'hate 
speech' laws. But it does mean that if the justification for the 
hate crimes measures is sufficiently neutral, the same should 
be said for narrow restrictions on hate speech.5 
The two cases, then, may be said to deal with one topic, hate 
speech, or as the late Harry Kalven called it, "ideological fighting 
words. "6 In some respects, these cases offer a replay of the con-
stitutional controversies that gave rise to some of our current 
first amendment doctrines: "fighting words," in Chaplinsky v. 
New Hamsphire (1942), what Kalven called "ideological fighting 
words" in Terminiello v. Chicago (1949), and "group libel" in 
Beauharnais v. Illinois (1953). The replay, however, takes place 
against a backdrop of the more speech protective cases of the 
1960s and 1970s: New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), Branden-
burg v. Ohio (1969), and Cohen v. California (1971), as well as 
the flag burning cases of 1989 and 1990. It also takes place at a 
time when there is both a widespread concern about and a con-
troversy over the distinctive harms resulting from speech or con-
duct which singles out individuals or groups on the basis of race 
or gender, sexual preference, religion, or national origin. 
The origin of this hate speech controversy is the movement 
for "hate speech" codes on college and university campuses, no-
tably at Michigan and Stanford in 1989-1990. In the Michigan 
case, a federal district court overturned Michigan's speech code 
and the university did not appeal the decision.7 The Stanford 
case did not get into the courts as Stanford is a private school, 
but it was debated on campus in terms of the first amendment 
5. Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 826 (1993). 
6. Harry Kalven Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 80-81 (Ja-
mie Kalven, ed., Harper Row, 1988). 
7. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
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standard and that debate has been widely publicized.s Many 
other colleges and universities followed with their own versions 
of a harassment or hate speech code, and I think it will become 
clear that the intensity of disagreement among the Justices in the 
R.A. V. case was due at least in part to the effect of that decision 
on speech codes at public colleges and universities. 
In part one, then, I will discuss the R.A. V. case. I will focus 
on three things: the concurring Justices' argument for decision by 
way of overbreadth; the majority opinion's application of two re-
lated requirements-content neutrality and viewpoint neutral-
ity-to speech hitherto regarded as categorically not protected 
and hence subject to prohibition; and Justice Stevens' argument 
concerning the inadequacy of the categorical approach and na-
ture of the harm of hate speech. 
In part two, I will discuss Wisconsin v. Mitchell, beginning 
with the opinions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. As already 
noted, the main issue concerns the extent to which protected 
speech is indirectly but nonetheless significantly punished. A 
related topic concerns the relationship between a penalty-en-
hancing statute and anti-discrimination laws. 
Finally, in conclusion, I will bring the two cases together by 
considering the conflict between, on the one hand, the neutrality 
requirement, with respect to content and especially "viewpoint," 
and, on the other, the harm of hate speech and the case for en-
hanced penalties for hate crimes as a way of getting around the 
first amendment barrier. 
I 
The city of St. Paul prosecuted "R.A.V." (the names of 
juveniles are withheld for confidentiality), under a Bias Moti-
vated Crime Ordinance for allegedly constructing a crudely-
made cross and burning it inside the fenced yard of a black fam-
ily. The authorities apparently chose to prosecute under the or-
dinance, rather than under more specific felony statutes9 to 
8. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1134-37 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991). 
Professor Gunther, who was himself actively engaged in opposing a speech code at Stan-
ford, provides important information about the regulation (at 1135 n.2), to which I will 
return. 
9. Justice Scalia identifies the following statutes which covered R.A.V.'s criminal 
conduct: one providing for up to five years imprisonment for terrorist threats; one provid-
ing for up to five years for arson; and one providing for up to one year and a $3,000 fine 
for damage to property. 112 S. Ct. at 2541 n.l. 
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highlight the city's condemnation of "hate crimes."to The ordi-
nance made it a misdemeanor for anyone to place "on public or 
private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization 
or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi 
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know 
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender. ... "n The state district court 
found the ordinance in violation of the First Amendment, but 
Minnesota's Supreme Court reversed, upholding the ordinance 
by interpreting it to reach no more than unprotected expression 
under the "fighting words" doctrine. According to that doctrine, 
"fighting words are those which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. "1z The 
Minnesota court said: "the ordinance censors only those displays 
that one knows or should know will create anger, alarm, or re-
sentment based on racial, ethnic, gender, or religious bias."B 
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, 
holding the ordinance unconstitutional. Justice White's pre-
ferred basis for deciding this case, with which Justices Blackmun, 
O'Connor and Stevens agreed, was to hold that the state 
supreme court had not narrowed the ordinance sufficiently, be-
cause it still criminalized protected speech: "expressive conduct 
that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment. "14 Even if 
10. I learned this from a telephone conversation, placed in the summer of 1992, with 
city attorney Natalie Hudson. I also learned that petitioner probably could not be 
charged under any of the other statutes, such as racially motivated assault, since after the 
Supreme Court decision he was no longer a minor. After having finished this article, I 
came across Edward J. Cleary's recently published book, Beyond the Burning Cross: The 
First Amendment and the Landmark R.A. V. Case (Random House, 1994). Mr. Cleary, an 
attorney who practices in St. Paul, Minn., was assigned to represent "R.A.V.," Robert 
Anthony Viktora, on June 25, 1990, along with every other juvenile who appeared in 
court that morning. He subsequently represented "R.A.V." all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Id. at 112. Mr. Cleary reports that 
[s]everal juveniles involved in the June 21, 1990 incident (including R.A.V.) 
were convicted in January 1993 of violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 
by a federal judge sitting without a jury. Both of these provisions punish all 
threats aimed at the exercise of federally guaranteed rights or privileges, unlike 
the St. Paul ordinance which prohibited the mere expression of an unpopular 
opinion. The individuals were referred for probable commitment to state juve-
nile facilities. Further details were withheld by federal authorities. Then on 
April26, 1994, a three-judge panel from the Eighth Circuit denied the appeals of 
all the juveniles. R.A.V., whose constitutional right to a bigoted viewpoint had 
been upheld after a two-year struggle, had eventually been punished for his con-
duct in the early morning hours of June 21, 1990. 
Id. at 256 n.223. 
11. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. 
12. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
13. In re R.A. V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1991). 
14. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (White, J., concurring). 
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petitioner's conduct would have been punishable under a nar-
rowly drawn ordinance, given the importance of freedom of 
speech, he is permitted to challenge the ordinance in the name of 
those whose expression is unconstitutionally "chilled." What is 
left of the "fighting words," if we follow Justice White's ap-
proach? In the original formulation, there were two "strands" to 
the doctrine: words "which by their very utterance inflict injury," 
and those which "tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace." Given the subsequent decisions involving libel and "of-
fensive speech," the latter of which include all kinds of profane 
speech, it is not clear what remains of the first strand of the doc-
trine. The second strand might be reducible to speech "directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to 
incite or produce such action," which can be prohibited under 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.ts In that case, a more candid treatment of 
the overbreadth issue would have required Justice White to ac-
knowledge that the "fighting words" doctrine has been reduced 
to the Brandenburg "incitement" test. 
If a majority had formed behind Justice White's "over-
breadth" analysis, tighter hate speech codes would not have be-
come presumptively unconstitutional, which may account for the 
majority opinion of Justice Scalia, which Justices Rehnquist, Ken-
nedy, Souter, and Thomas joined. Accepting the state's interpre-
tation of the ordinance as limited to "fighting words," Justice 
Scalia applied the "content-neutrality" rule to strike it down. 
The doctrine of "content-neutrality" means that government can-
not regulate or prohibit speech or expression on the basis of "its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."t6 The doc-
trine is complicated-sometimes it is presented in a narrower 
version as "viewpoint neutrality" -but it had always been ap-
plied to speech that could be indirectly regulated but could not 
be prohibited. For example, an otherwise legitimate regulation 
of speech on the basis of time, place, or manner (i.e., no picket-
ing near a school when it is in session) would be invalidated if it 
discriminated on the basis of the content of the message (i.e., no 
picketing near a school, except for labor unions). For the first 
time, the Court majority applied the content neutrality require-
ment to categories of proscribable speech, such as obscenity or 
"fighting words." This novelty is revealed by examining Justice 
Scalia's reinterpretation of the Court's earlier account of its cate-
gorical approach. Under the earlier account, such unprotected 
15. 395 u.s. 444, 447 (1969). 
16. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
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categories were " 'not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech'." Justice Scalia interpreted this to mean "that 
these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amend-
ment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable 
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are catego-
ries of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they 
may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to 
their distinctively proscribable content."t7 Justice Scalia cited 
New York v. Ferber,ts where the Court upheld the state's prohibi-
tion on child pornography, since there was no question of censor-
ing a particular literary theme (which is to say no content 
discrimination was involved).19 But that case involved protected 
speech-non-obscene pornography-where an otherwise imper-
missible prohibition was upheld on the grounds of the special 
harm associated with the use of minors in making such protected 
pornography. As Justice Scalia remarked, no content discrimina-
tion was involved. R.A. V. was the first time the Court held that 
categorically unprotected speech was subject to the protection of 
the content-neutrality rule. Thus, it is now impermissible to pick 
out certain "fighting words" for punishment on the basis of 
content. 
Justice White criticized this position by saying it introduced 
a prohibition on "under-inclusiveness," and that the Court was 
insisting on an "all or nothing" approach to proscribable speech. 
And Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia for relying on con-
tent neutrality in the first place. Drawing on his plurality opin-
ions in Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc.w and FCC v. 
Pacifica,zt in which he introduced the concept of levels of pro-
tected speech to justify restrictions on "adult entertainment" and 
crude words on the radio, as well as his concurring opinions in 
the child pornography case and certain commercial speech cases, 
Justice Stevens argued that the Court has not always followed 
content neutrality and that it should not.zz 
Justice Scalia tried to defend his position by holding onto the 
categorical approach and by responding to Justice White. Justice 
Scalia responded first by arguing that a content neutrality re-
quirement is narrower than under-inclusiveness. Then he argued 
that content discrimination is permissible when "the basis for [it] 
17. 112 S. Ct. at 2543. 
18. 458 u.s. 747 (1982). 
19. ld. at 763. 
20. 427 u.s. 50 (1976). 
21. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
22. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564, 2566-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at 
issue is proscribable. "23 His illustration is a state choosing to 
prohibit only the most patently offensive of obscenity, when it 
could prohibit it all; that is constitutional, but a state choosing to 
prohibit "only that obscenity which includes offensive political 
messages" would not be permitted.24 Another example draws on 
Watts v. United States,25 where the Court upheld a federal law 
criminalizing threats of violence directed against the President; 
this is legitimate "under inclusiveness," for Justice Scalia, 
whereas criminalizing only those threats "that mention his policy 
on aid to inner cities" would be invalid.26 Justice Scalia also sug-
gested that content-based classifications are permissible where 
they are associated with "particular 'secondary effects' of the 
speech" which produce harms that can be prohibited.27 
Justice Scalia's clearest and best statement is that content 
discrimination may be allowed as long as "there is no realistic 
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."28 The worst 
form of content discrimination, in other words, is viewpoint dis-
crimination, and that cannot be allowed at any time.29 As Justice 
Scalia put it, if the Bias Motivated Crime ordinance were upheld, 
"[o]ne could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all 'anti-
Catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all 'papists' are, for 
that would insult and provoke violence 'on the basis of religion'. 
St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to 
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensbury Rules. "30 
On a first reading this hypothetical appears so bizarre, as 
well as perhaps difficult to follow, that one might conclude that a 
law student has worked too hard to manufacture a difference. 
When is the last time we saw a sign which said that "all anti-
Catholic bigots are misbegotten"? I think Justice Scalia has a 
point here, but it takes some working through. 
Justice Stevens, in reply, claims that 
23. Id. at 2545. 
24. Id. at 2546 (emphasis in original). 
25. 394 u.s. 705 (1969). 
26. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 2547. 
29. The Supreme Court has recently accepted certiorari in the case of Rosenberger 
v. Rector, University of Virginia. The question presented is: "Does Establishment Clause 
compel state university to exclude otherwise eligible student publication from participa-
tion in student activities fund, solely on basis of its religious viewpoint, when such exclu-
sion would violate Speech and Press Clauses if viewpoint of publication were non-
religious?" 63 U.S.L.W. 3276 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1994) (No. 94-329). 
30. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. 
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the Court's reasoning is asymmetrical. The response to a sign 
saying that "all [religious] bigots are misbegotten" is a sign 
saying that "all advocates of religious tolerance are misbegot-
ten." Assuming such signs could be fighting words (which 
seems to me extremely unlikely), neither sign would be 
banned by the ordinance for the attacks were not "based on 
... religion" but rather on one's beliefs about tolerance.Jt 
Justice Stevens' revision did not so much make the argu-
ments symmetrical as it shifted the grounds from particularity to 
generality. One can imagine an argument on the pros and cons 
of religious tolerance, but street talk gets down to particulars, 
and at that level Justice Scalia's description is accurate. 
Another way to consider the issue is to think of profane 
words (Justice Scalia's "misbegotten" is a euphemism for one of 
them) addressed to an individual in such a way as likely to incite 
to violence and then combine those words with the proscribed 
categories of the ordinance: race, color, creed, religion, or gen-
der. According to Justice Stevens, the ordinance, assuming that 
it is not fatally overbroad, "regulates speech not on the basis of 
its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but rather on the 
basis of the harm the speech causes. "32 The ordinance regulates 
"only a subcategory of expression that causes injuries based on 
'race, color, creed, religion, or gender,' not a subcategory that 
involves discussions that concern those characteristics."JJ But 
according to Justice Scalia, the effect is a viewpoint based ordi-
nance: there were many content and viewpoint neutral alterna-
tives available to St. Paul-the laws were on the books available 
for use-but "the only interest distinctively served by the content 
limitation [we might say the content emphasis] is that of display-
ing the city council's special hostility towards the particular bi-
ases thus singled out. That is precisely what the Frrst 
Amendment forbids. "34 Justice Scalia seems to be right that the 
ordinance, as it has been interpreted to keep it constitutional, 
singles out for special prohibition those fighting words which 
convey hostility and are likely to incite to violence on the basis of 
certain categories only, not others. 
31. Id. at 2571 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
32. Id. at 2570 (emphasis in original). 
33. Id. 
34. ld. at 2550. 
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II 
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, decided one year after R.A. V. v. St. 
Paul, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court and sustained a Wisconsin statute, similar to that 
of many other states, which provides for penalty enhancements 
for hate crimes, where the victim was intentionally selected be-
cause of his or her race, religion, color, disability, sexual orienta-
tion, national origin or ancestry.3s The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court had found two first amendment violations in the "because 
of" character of the selection: it impermissibly punished "what 
the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought," and it had 
an indirect "chilling effect" on free speech as well.36 On the first 
point, the court argued that "[m]erely because the statute refers 
in a literal sense to the intentional 'conduct' of selecting, [it] does 
not mean the court must tum a blind eye to the intent and practi-
cal effect of the law-punishment of offensive motive or 
thought."37 To confirm that the statute punished "bigoted 
thought," which involves "the actor's motive or reason for sin-
gling out the particular person against whom he or she commits a 
crime,"38 not merely "conduct," the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
quoted from an amended version of the law, which clarified that 
the ground of selection "in whole or in part because of the actor's 
belief or perception regarding the race ... whether or not the ac-
tor's belief or perception was correct."39 
The "chilling effect," or "overbreadth" argument is that 
under this statute a misdemeanor is converted into a felony 
merely because of the spoken word. For example, if A strikes 
B in the face he commits a criminal battery. However, should 
A add a word such as "nigger," "honkey," "jew," "mick," 
"kraut," "spic," or "queer," the crime becomes a felony, and 
A will be punished not for his conduct alone-a misde-
meanor-but for using the spoken word. Obviously, the state 
would respond that the speech is merely an indication that A 
35. The statute at the time of Mitchell's crime is reproduced in full in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. a. at 2197 n.l. 
36. 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992). This opinion frequently quotes from Susan 
Gellman's excellent law review article: Sticks and Stones Can Put You In Jai~ But Can 
Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation 
Laws, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 333 (1991). 
37. 485 N.W.2d at 813. 
38. ld. 
39. Id. at 813 n.12. The italicized portion is new. While the amended statute 
postdated Mitchell's trial, the majority evidently took it to clarify the original intention, 
not to change anything. "Thus the legislature has removed any doubt that the aim of the 
statute is the actor's subjective motivation." ld. 
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intentionally selected B because of his particular race or 
ethnicity, but the fact remains that the necessity to use speech 
to prove this intentional selection threatens to chill free 
speech. Opprobrious though the speech may be, an individual 
must be allowed to utter it without fear of punishment by the 
state.40 
Two Justices on the Wisconsin high court dissented. One, 
acknowledging that she would not have supported such a statute, 
wrote that "the tight nexus between the selection of the victim 
and the underlying crime ... saves this statute."4t The other re-
garded the law as an "anti-discrimination" law more than any-
thing else: "both [traditional anti-discrimination laws and this 
"hate crimes" type] involve discrimination, both involve victims, 
both involve actions 'because of' the victim's status."42 
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowl-
edged that the statute enhances the maximum penalty "for con-
duct motivated by a discriminatory point of view," thereby 
punishing it "more severely than the same conduct engaged in 
for some other reason or for no reason at all. "43 The Court then 
solved this seemingly difficult first amendment issue with refer-
ence to the traditional leeway given to sentencing judges on the 
one hand and the primary responsibility of legislatures "for fixing 
criminal penalties" on the other.44 The Court also likened what 
Wisconsin's legislature did to what juries do in death penalty 
cases, when they consider aggravating and extenuating circum-
stances in the penalty phase of their deliberations.4s But this 
statute singles out for special enhanced punishment only one fac-
tor from among many. A sentencing judge given discretion is 
required to take into account the "totality of circumstances" in 
setting the proper punishment. A sentencing jury in a capital 
case is required to take account of any and all aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, and it must find at least one aggravat-
ing circumstance to decide on the death penalty. Similarly, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines reflect a congressionally author-
ized and approved ranking of degrees of severity of crimes and 
corresponding punishments. 
While the Court's argument does not address the free 
speech issue directly, it seems to signal a minimalist scrutiny of 
40. Id. at 816. 
41. ld. at 818 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
42. I d. at 820 (Bablitch, J ., dissenting). 
43. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. a. at 2199. 
44. Id. at 2200. 
45. Id. 
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the statute, notwithstanding the strict scrutiny to which statutes 
challenged under the First Amendment are supposed to be sub-
jected. This is confirmed by the next step in the argument, where 
the Court claimed that "motive plays the same role under the 
Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidis-
crimination laws, which we have previously upheld against con-
stitutional challenge."46 But the underlying act in the enhanced 
penalty for hate crimes law-the basic misdemeanor or felony-
is itself unlawful, with the victim selection then identified for an 
enhanced penalty. The underlying act in a civil anti-discrimina-
tion case is a selection of one or more over others for employ-
ment or admission, which, in the absence of the additional illegal 
act-of selection or non-selection on the basis of one of the pro-
scribed categories- is not itself illegal. Put differently, one does 
not ordinarily have a right to be selected for a competitive posi-
tion, but given the prevalence of frequent discrimination against 
certain well-defined discrete minorities, government which aims 
to secure equal rights has no alternative but to pass and uphold 
traditional anti-discrimination laws. 
We do have a choice when it comes to criminal law, where 
the ordinary expectation is that law and punishment takes ac-
count of all relevant features of culpability. Consider, for exam-
ple, an alternative to our actual case, in which a few young men 
decide to select their victims arbitrarily and beat them to a pulp, 
either for money or just for the sheer pleasure of doing it. Which 
is the more heinous crime, and hence which should be punished 
the more severely? In our case, Mitchell could conceivably argue 
in mitigation that he was "carried away for the moment" by the 
images of racial injustice against blacks that he had just seen in 
Mississippi Burning. 
When the Supreme Court finally addressed the free speech 
issue, it simply asserted that unlike the R.A. V. case, which "was 
explicitly directed at expression," "the statute in this case is 
aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment."47 This 
limp assertion is disappointing. More needs to be said, but all we 
get is the statement that "this (bias-inspired] conduct is thought 
to inflict greater individual and societal harm."48 With a refer-
ence to Blackstone on the reasonableness of having crimes of dif-
ferent natures punished with different severities, a brief rejection 
of the "chilling effect" argument as "too speculative" when ap-
46. Id. 
47. I d. at 2201. 
48. ld. 
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plied to the bigot who must suppress his expression for fear of 
subsequently having it enhance a penalty, and a remark that 
speech is sometimes used as evidence "to establish the elements 
of a crime," as in treason cases, the Court concludes that the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin must be reversed.49 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decisions in these two cases may each 
be justified: the former on the basis of the problem with view-
point discrimination and the latter on the basis of the difference 
between a regulation which suppresses speech directly and a reg-
ulation whose purpose is to punish conduct, but which inciden-
tally punishes expression. Each case, however, involves a 
constitutional challenge to a legislative attempt to "denounce" 
certain forms of speech which common-sensically, as Justice Ste-
vens has written, rank very low but which our First Amendment 
constitutional doctrines, deriving from the political philosophy of 
John Stuart Mill, namely viewpoint neutrality, do not permit the 
Court to treat in that common-sensical manner.so Much of what 
Justice Stevens says about different levels of speech deserves to 
be considered, but controversies over speech codes at Michigan, 
Stanford, and the University of Pennsylvania reveal that in the 
absence of a viewpoint neutrality approach, the protected catego-
ries are subject to the partisanship of the "politically correct." 
Gerald Gunther includes in his recent constitutional law 
casebook the relevant text of Stanford's speech code. It appears 
to track "fighting words," but Gunther, who opposed the code, 
then reports that 
[a]s interpreted by the Chair of the Council which promul-
gated this "discriminatory harassment" regulation, it would 
not bar a black student from calling a white student a "honky 
SOB," on the ground that the white majority is not in as much 
need of protection from such speech as are those who have 
suffered discrimination.st 
That's why Justice Scalia wrote the opinion he did in R.A. V. and 
that's why he was right. 
As for Wisconsin v. Mitchell, I think Justice Shirley Abra-
hamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court got it right when she 
said: "Had I been in the legislature, I do not believe I would have 
49. ld. at 2201-02. 
50. In addition to his R.A. V. opinion, see Justice Stevens' recent essay, The Freedom 
of Speech, 102 Yale LJ. 1293 (1993). 
51. Gunther, Constitutional Law at 1135 n.2 (cited in note 8). 
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supported this statute because I do not think this statute will ac-
complish its goal. "sz The statute introduces race and other such 
controversial classifications where they are not necessary and 
where they are likely to do more mischief than good. 
52. 485 N.W.2d at 818. 
